



**No one written off: reforming welfare to reward responsibility:  
A Response to the Green Paper from One Parent Families |  
Gingerbread**

**Executive summary**

**Introduction**

- Government has made good progress in tackling child poverty, and increasing the employment rate of disadvantaged groups. We particularly welcome the announcement in this Green Paper that a full child maintenance disregard will be introduced: we have long argued for this and believe it will have a significant impact on child poverty.
- However, we question whether now is the time to introduce further tough conditions on claimants of out of work benefits. Evidence to support such changes is weak, Jobcentre Plus has a heavy workload, and the economic downturn is already increasing unemployment. With both the economy and Jobcentre Plus already feeling the strain, adding to the pressures on claimants would be the wrong way forward.

**Lone Parents and employment**

- The majority of the lone parents want to be active in the labour market. But, while paid work can bring significant benefits for parents and children, it is far from a guarantee of avoiding poverty. Lone parents also face well-documented problems in terms of poor job retention and progression in the labour market.
- Government needs to do more to improve lone parents' chances of staying in a job and progressing in the workplace. *No one written off* is primarily concerned with encouraging a higher volume of entry into employment for lone parents. There is a point at which this approach will only lead to small increases in the net employment rate because of the high probability of job exit.

**Conditionality**

- Evidence that increasing the pressure on single parents with the threat of sanctions will lead to sustainable employment is weak. DWP research published in 2008 found that sanctions had very little impact on lone parents' behaviour.

- If sanctions are to be applied they must be seen to be fair and predictable, and the use of adviser discretion limited.
- We would oppose moves to allow advisers to sanction claimants for failure to engage with an activity plan, or to participate in compulsory training.
- Any future sanctions policies must ensure that parents and their children are protected from drastic income cuts.
- We are unconvinced that ‘work for the dole’ programmes will significantly increase the likelihood of parents moving into work. If such programmes are implemented, they will need to take the needs of parents into account.

### **Skills Provision**

- We welcome the focus on skills provision, but do not support mandating single parents with children aged between five and seven to undertake training.
- Single parents on Jobseeker’s Allowance will have their access to training considerably restricted. We do not believe the ‘flexibility’ introduced to allow training for eight week periods will be anywhere near sufficient to allow for the high quality skills upgrading required by many parents.
- Whilst progress has been made, more must be done to integrate the employment and skills systems. This should include
  - An integrated set of targets, including those for Jobcentre Plus, clearly focused on sustainable employment;
  - Funding for skills provision that is outcome based in line with these targets,
  - A clear skills delivery path.

### **Contracting out and the Flexible New Deal**

- We are unclear that greater use of the private sector will lead to more sustainable job outcomes, cost savings, or greater claimant choice.
- Contracts must include incentives for dealing with the ‘hardest to help’. These might include a payment ‘escalator’ whereby there are greater rewards for the tenth client helped into work than for the first, and a contractual stipulation that certain groups, including lone parents, must form a proportion of job outcomes in line with their representation amongst the total client group.
- Engagement in delivery by many charities, including One Parent Families| Gingerbread, is likely to be dependent on whether we are able to do so without our activities leading to the imposition of benefit sanctions on a lone parent, with consequent impact on that parent’s child or children. If Government wishes to encourage third sector engagement in the delivery of welfare to work services, it will need to listen carefully to the concerns of organisations who also wish to protect the rights of their clients.
- We recommend the establishment of a local, independent, ombudsman within each region, who is tasked with investigating complaints about unfair, discriminatory, or degrading treatment by Flexible New Deal providers.
- Complaints to the ombudsman that are upheld should be accompanied by financial penalties for the provider, and, in addition, complaints above a defined number should result in immediate termination of the contract.

### **‘Streamlining’ the Benefits System**

- Proposals to streamline the benefits system must recognise that there are groups for whom paid work may not be the most appropriate short term outcome.
- Lone parents with children aged 0-7 may fall into this group, and we would strongly oppose any move to transfer them to Jobseeker’s Allowance. We also feel that such a move is likely to compromise the integrity of the Jobseeker’s Allowance regime.
- Rather, we would recommend that this group should be moved to the support rate of Employment and Support Allowance
- Lone parents who have experienced domestic violence should also be enabled to access the support rate of Employment and Support Allowance for a period of at least a year.
- This provision could be extended to all lone parents who claim benefits as a result of relationship breakdown or job loss once their youngest child is aged seven or over.

### **The way forward**

- As employees, lone parents will require particular support and flexibility to be in place to ensure that their employment is sustainable. It is vital that employers are enabled (and if necessary compelled) to meet these needs. While the Government has already taken important steps forward in this area, we are keen that lone parents have access to greater statutory rights when necessary.
- We also hope that greater emphasis will be placed on extending childcare provision as one of the crucial elements underpinning a successful employment strategy.
- The Social Fund remains unfit for purpose. The Government urgently needs to take meaningful steps towards reforming it so that the Fund can start to fulfil its most basic functions.
- More lone parents could be returned to sustainable employment under a regime that focuses on incentivisation and support rather than on sanctions. One starting point would be tackling the poor incentives for those who wish to work for less than 16 hours a week.

### **Conclusion**

- In this Green paper the Government outlines a vision of a welfare state which balances an individual’s rights against their responsibilities. Yet for groups such as lone parents we have seen a growing emphasis on responsibilities at the expense of their rights to take decisions about their working lives.
- Nevertheless we are keen to ensure that these reforms are implemented as smoothly as possible. We believe the risks can be minimised if the Government takes the time to learn lessons from abroad and from the early stages of the Flexible New Deal.

## 1. Introduction

- 1.1 One Parent Families|Gingerbread (the two charities recently merged) is the national charity representing the 1.9 million lone parents and their three million children in Britain. The charity aims to tackle the poverty, stigma and social exclusion still faced by too many one-parent families today.
- 1.2 The charity campaigns actively on policy issues, runs a help and advice line, and runs training and back to work programmes for lone parents. We received 23,000 calls last year from lone parents, on a wide range of issues including benefits and tax credits, child maintenance, employment, housing, and family law. We also run the lone parent strand of Marks & Spencer's Marks & Start programme, providing training and work experience to help lone parents gain paid work.
- 1.3 We welcome the opportunity to respond to *No one written off: reforming welfare to reward responsibility*. We are extremely pleased to note that the Government proposes to introduce a full disregard of child maintenance for calculating out-of-work benefits from April 2010. One Parent Families|Gingerbread has recommended such a move on a number of occasions; we think it will have a positive impact on the levels of maintenance being paid and on the income of many lone parents.
- 1.4 We also welcome any proposals to help lone parents to access sustainable quality employment. However, we are concerned that proposals to increase the use of sanctions and compulsory work experience pay insufficient attention to the evidence in these areas, to the current strain on Jobcentre Plus, and to the economic climate.
- 1.5 Jobcentre Plus will this year be implementing the Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), and transferring around 120,000 lone parents from Income Support (IS) to the more intensive Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) regime. The following year a major change to the way in which employment services are delivered will be introduced with the Flexible New Deal. The latest figures show that unemployment reached 1.79 million in August, with the claimant count approaching a million.<sup>i</sup> Without having had time to review the introduction of ESA or the transfer from IS to JSA we would question whether this is the time to accelerate the pace of change.
- 1.6 We also are keen to ensure that the benefit system maintains its vital role as a safety net as well as a springboard. Beveridge devised the welfare state in response to the mass unemployment of the 1930s, and it is vital that those who suffer the results of economic slowdowns are supported. But there are also people for whom in the short term, work may not be a realistic or achievable option, for example, those who have recently experienced domestic violence. We have no desire to see these people 'written off', but there does need to be a recognition that for some groups work will not be the immediate destination but the goal in the long term'
- 1.7 Rather than departing from the course of reform previously laid out by the Government, *No one written off* progresses a number of policies which have already been set in motion. Alongside responding to the new proposals contained in this Green Paper we will outline our position on four of these key policy areas: **conditionality and sanctions, skills provision, contracting out of employment services** and the '**streamlining**' of the benefit system.

- 1.8 We do not comment on proposals to implement a full child maintenance disregard, but fully support this decision, and are particularly pleased to see the introduction of this measure, which we have long campaigned for. We also do not discuss our opposition to proposals for compulsory joint registration of births. Further discussion can be found in our response to the initial consultation.

## **2: Lone Parents and Employment**

- 2.1 Research backs up what we know from our work with lone parents: the vast majority want to be in paid work when this is right for them and their children.<sup>ii</sup> As constraints on working have been removed, including a lack of childcare and a fear of being worse off in work, many more lone parents have moved into the labour market. The twelve percentage point rise in lone parent employment between 1997 and 2008 is faster than that for any other ‘disadvantaged’ group’.
- 2.2 Clearly, paid work can bring significant benefits for families. Children whose lone parent is in work face a significantly reduced risk of poverty, due to the fact that out of work benefits are set well below the poverty line. Lone parents in recent research undertaken by One Parent Families|Gingerbread on behalf of the London Child Poverty Commission told us that there could be significant social and emotional benefits from work<sup>iii</sup> and research by Tess Ridge found that children whose lone parent had moved into stable employment could see real benefits in financial terms.<sup>iv</sup>
- 2.3 But for many lone parents (for example those who have recently experienced domestic violence) work is not always the right choice at a particular point in time. For some it is simply not possible to combine their caring responsibilities with work. Furthermore, being in work is no guarantee of avoiding poverty entirely: recent research by Save the Children into Britain’s poorest children found that those in most hardship were disproportionately likely to live in families which had experienced one or more transitions between work and benefits.<sup>v</sup>
- 2.4 Lone parents also face well-documented problems in terms of poor job retention and progression. For example, in 2002–03 lone parents were twice as likely to leave work as non-lone parents.<sup>vi</sup> Around 10 per cent of lone parents quit their job in any one year (although working lone parents are less likely to leave their jobs today than they were a decade ago). Between 18 and 20 per cent of those leaving the New Deal for Lone Parents return to benefit within six months, 29 per cent return within a year and 40 per cent return within two and a half years.<sup>vii</sup>
- 2.5 On the basis of this evidence One Parent Families|Gingerbread has long argued that the Government needs to do more to improve lone parents’ chances of staying in a job and progressing in the workplace. *No one written off* is primarily concerned with encouraging a higher volume of entry into employment for lone parents. There is a point at which this approach will only lead to small increases in the net employment rate because of the high probability of job exit. Research from 2007 suggests that if lone parents’ job retention rate could be raised to that of other groups, the Government’s target for 70 per cent of lone parents to be in employment by 2010 could be met without further increasing job entry rates.<sup>viii</sup>
- 2.6 Improving the prospects of sustainable employment for lone parents is a challenging task. Recognising the progress the Government have made, our view remains that it requires further investment in support services, and a greater focus on ensuring that work is compatible with parents, as well as ensuring

parents are ready for the work place. As we outline in further detail below, we are unconvinced that what is needed is greater pressure on parents themselves.

### 3. Conditionality

#### *The effectiveness of sanctions*

3.1 A 2008 DWP paper on ‘The Role of Conditionality in the Welfare State’ defines conditionality as: ‘the expectations of different groups of people and the potential sanctions they could face.’<sup>ix</sup> Over the past few years, the Government has gradually been extending the conditions attached to the benefits claimed by lone parents. In 2001, Work Focused Interviews were introduced for some lone parents, and these were gradually extended to all lone parents by 2004.

3.2 The decision was taken last year to transfer lone parents with children aged seven and over to Jobseeker’s Allowance regime, where they will face further conditions to search for and take up paid work, facing sanctions if they fail to do so. *No-one written off* proposes that sanctions are escalated for those claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance, and introduced for other activities so that:

- Failure to attend an interview without good cause would automatically lead to loss of benefit
- A second failure to attend would mean the loss of two weeks benefit; and
- Advisers will be able to mandate full time activity at any time for those claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance.
- Lone parents will be mandated to attend a skills health check, and pilots will be introduced that mandate participation in training where the adviser believes this to be necessary.

It is notable that these proposals sit uneasily with the flexibilities recently introduced for parents as part of the changes to lone parent benefits. These ensure that:

- At least two efforts will be made to contact parents before they receive a sanction; and
- Parents will not be expected to take up jobs that require them to work for more than 16 hours a week.

We return to this point in the section on benefit simplification.

3.3 One Parent Families|Gingerbread argued against the change to Jobseeker’s Allowance, and we remain unconvinced that sanctions are an effective means of either changing lone parents behaviour, or enabling them to address the constraints they face to work.

3.4 Chapter Two of *No one written off* states that: ‘Benefit sanctions have been successful for the majority of jobseekers.’<sup>x</sup> Given that the DWP has, on a number of occasions, stated its commitment to evidence based policy-making, we find this comment surprising. Research from 2008 (commissioned by the DWP) clearly demonstrates that imposing sanctions only has a negligible effect on lone parents’ labour market decisions. The study indicates that sanctions do not promote job-seeking behaviour - although a very small number of parents said that the risk of, or the implementation of, a sanction ‘may’ have made a difference. It is also a cause for concern that lone parents who continued to live with a sanction demonstrated higher levels of ill health, both of themselves and of their children.<sup>xi</sup> It is notable that a lone parents’ failure to attend a WFI tended to

be for reasons linked to health, caring responsibilities or general levels of disorganisation (forgetting the appointment). There was no evidence of lone parents making an active decision to not attend a WFI.

- 3.5 The number of lone parents receiving such sanctions has shown a marked increase in recent years. In the year 2005 – 2006 over 40,000 lone parents were sanctioned (compared with 5,600 Lone Parents in 2002 – 2003).<sup>xii</sup> No corresponding increase has been seen in the number of lone parents entering employment.
- 3.6 This backs up well known international evidence, summarised by Jane Millar in a review of welfare to work programmes:

*“...the research evidence suggests that some small degree of compulsion (such as Work Focussed Interviews) can be helpful, but that beyond that point compulsion can easily become counter productive.....Compulsion is also costly in time and resources. Staff spend a lot of time on arranging compulsory interviews, chasing people who do not attend and applying sanctions. Participants spend too much time fulfilling compulsory conditions and less time on job search or preparing for work.”<sup>xiii</sup>*

- 3.7 The country most often cited in support of greater sanctioning is the U.S. But US policy aimed not to move parents into employment, but to reduce the numbers of those claiming financial support. The latest figures show that by 2004, nearly 20 per cent of low income single mothers were neither in employment or entitled to financial support, and that those with the greatest barriers to work were the most likely to be disconnected.<sup>xiv</sup> Sanctions may be an effective way of deterring benefit claims, but the evidence that they encourage lone parents to move into sustained employment is thin.

#### *What activities should be subject to sanctions?*

- 3.8 We are unconvinced by the use of sanctions as a policy tool. However, if sanctions are to be applied, it is vital that their use is seen to be fair. While we are keen to see tailored, responsive *employment* programmes, we believe that discretionary *sanctions* regimes are unfair and unpredictable for claimants. There is clear evidence from the United States that advisers are influenced by their own views and prejudices when making decisions about who to sanction. A recent review found that after controlling for other factors, black women were more likely to have their claims terminated, and Latina women were more likely to receive a reduction in benefit.<sup>xv</sup> Claimants need to be clear about the circumstances in which they will face a sanction, and able to challenge this when they feel it has been applied unfairly. Whilst *No-one written off* states that 40% of claimants believe their sanction to be fair, surely more striking is the 60% who therefore believe that it is not so.
- 3.9 We do not believe that sanctions should be applied for non-attendance at regular interviews with Jobcentre Plus, a Flexible New Deal provider, or at a Skills Health Check . However, we believe there is a stronger case for making these activities sanctionable than there is for mandating engagement in an action plan decided on by a personal adviser.
- 3.10 Mandating engagement in activities (rather than attendance at interviews) presents a number of problems for advisers working both in Jobcentre Plus and

on Flexible New Deal contracts. Firstly, it is likely to limit the claimant's willingness to trust and work with the adviser. Secondly, it places too much discretion with the adviser over what is an appropriate activity, and whether a claimant should face a sanction if they fail to complete it. Thirdly, attaching sanctions to an action plan places the claimant in a dilemma. If they choose to take ambitious steps to look for work, but fail to complete these, they increase their own risk of being sanctioned. There are clear incentives for them to limit the activities they agree to participate in.

- 3.11 We are therefore clear that lone parents with children aged five to seven should not be subject to sanctions for failure to participate in skills training.

#### *The level of sanctions*

- 3.12 Parents are currently defined as a 'vulnerable' group, and are eligible to apply for hardship payments which ensure that they receive 60 per cent of benefit. We would be extremely concerned were any of these proposals (for example that to remove benefits for a two week period) were to lead to loss of this protection.

#### *'Work for dole'*

- 3.13 As part of the Government's drive to ensure that a 'something for something approach applies to everyone'<sup>xvi</sup> this Green paper proposes to pilot mandatory, full-time activity for those who have not found work at the end of the Flexible New Deal process, and to allow this to be imposed at any point during the claim. As many lone parents will now be subject to JSA regulations, we imagine that this is intended to apply to them also. We have major reservations about such plans, and believe such a scheme would be inappropriate for parents with complex caring responsibilities. Furthermore, there are a number of unanswered questions about the nature of this work and the content of these programmes. We suspect it will be hard to guarantee that the work will not be low-skilled and stigmatising.
- 3.14 The Government acknowledges that such programmes will not be 'cost-free'; indeed it is likely that they will be very expensive – particularly as they will cater for individuals with multiple barriers to working. We would also question whether rising unemployment will limit the capacity of Jobcentres or providers to source, and workplaces to supply such positions. The Government seems confident that costs will be offset by improved job outcomes for participants, referring to Australia's 'Work for the Dole' scheme had a 7 per cent net increase of participants going into jobs. In fact this seems to be rather a small increase and other research suggests that it has not supported by evidence from other countries who have also introduced 'workfare' schemes.
- 3.15 For example, research commissioned by DWP in 2008 reviews the evidence from three countries that operate workfare schemes: the United States (US), Canada and Australia. It finds that dramatic reductions in welfare caseloads in the US and Canada cannot be attributed to workfare alone. In fact, it can even reduce employment chances by limiting the time available for job search and by failing to provide the skills and experience valued by employers. Given the current economic climate in the UK, it is also of interest that the research finds that '*Workfare is least effective in getting people into jobs in weak labour markets where unemployment is high.*' In Canada the research found that off those that found employment, much of the work secured was short-term or low-paid. Meanwhile, for lone parents it is of considerable concern that:

*‘Welfare recipients with multiple barriers often find it difficult to meet obligations to take part in unpaid work. This can lead to sanctions and, in the most extreme cases, the complete withdrawal of benefits that leaves some individuals with no work and no income.’<sup>xvii</sup>*

3.16 It is notable that many of countries which had initially introduced stricter welfare regimes have now gravitated towards more flexible, so called ‘softer’ arrangements. For example, in the US where the original work first and full engagement models changed as states developed new support services, supplemented workfare with waged transitional jobs, and placed greater emphasis on job retention, skills acquisition and career development.<sup>xviii</sup> It is always difficult to draw firm conclusions from international welfare reform given the profound differences between national labour markets, childcare provision and demographics. However, we do not believe there is a strong case demonstrating that workfare significantly increases employment rates, and would again question whether a time of rising unemployment, is right for what amounts to compulsory work at a rate well below the National Minimum Wage.

## **2. Skills Provision**

- 4.1 We welcome the focus on skills as part of a strategy to increase the sustainability of employment. We know that the one group for whom employment outcomes have not improved over the last ten years is those with low skills. However, as stated above, we are unconvinced that compelling participation in training for parents with children aged 5 – 7 yrs is the right way forward. A compulsory skills interview may be a useful way of ensuring that lone parents know of the provision available. Compulsory participation however is unlikely to enthruse lone parents about the benefits of learning, and, as described above, relies too much on discretionary adviser decisions. We know that training is not the right route to work for all; making participation compulsory may in some cases delay job entry.
- 4.2 We also note that many lone parents will see their opportunity to train diminished under the new regime of Jobseeker’s Allowance. The proposals to make skills participation dependent on the age of the child ignore the fact that the majority of lone parents do not become a lone parent when their child is born and remain on benefits thereafter. For those who enter lone parenthood when their child is aged 7 or above, opportunities to train whilst accessing Jobseeker’s Allowance are minimal, with only 8 weeks of full time provision allowed. Whilst we welcome the piloting of a skills premium for those with children aged under 5 who take up training, we would prefer to see such a premium applied to all those participating in training geared towards improving their employment prospects.
- 4.3 Joining up the employment and skills system is an area where significant progress remains to be made. The skills health check, adult advancement and careers service and skills accounts are all extremely welcome initiatives. But until the target and funding systems for the employment and skills systems are aligned, they will continue to operate in silos.
- 4.4 In a paper published this May by One Parent Families|Gingerbread and Work Directions<sup>xix</sup> we recommended:

- *An integrated set of targets clearly focused on sustainable employment.*

Jobcentre Plus advisers need to be measured on meeting sustainable rather than short-term employment targets. This will provide an incentive to work with skills advisers to develop effective pathways for clients. At the very minimum we suggest that targets are aligned with those of the Flexible New Deal providers at six months. We understand that measured sustainability through the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study will not be timely (there is a two year delay on data). However, within the pilots we suggest that sustainability could be measured using staying off benefits as a proxy for working. If this was the case, the data could be easily and swiftly made available by using a JSAPs check.

- *Funding for skills provision that is outcome based in line with these targets.*

Funding sustainable employment rather than qualification outcomes will enable the Advancement and Careers Service and Jobcentre Plus advisers and their clients to make decisions based on what courses have the greatest chance of moving them towards, and continuing to progress within work. A change in the way learning provision is measured and funded should drive delivery behaviour more closely aligned with the overall policy objective.

- *A clear delivery path for skills access*

At the current point it is unclear who ultimately makes the choice about what training that claimant should access when a claimant is referred by Jobcentre Plus to the AACCS for their skills health check. We can envisage situations where the AACCS adviser refers a claimant to training, but the Jobcentre Plus adviser will not let them undertake this as part of their Jobseeker's Agreement. If Jobcentre Plus is to have this ultimate responsibility, the importance of changing their targets to deliver sustainable job outcomes will be magnified.

- 4.5 We welcomed the announcement in *Work Skills* that pilots will be run to use Skills Accounts for provision of level 3 courses to adults, and to meet costs such as childcare that may be a barrier to taking these up. We hope that the *No-one written off* can help to roll out these proposals nationally.

## **5. Contracting out and the Flexible New Deal**

- 5.1 One Parent Families|Gingerbread does not take a position on the preferred delivery agent for employment services; public private or voluntary sector. We are interested in whether the services lone parents receive are effective at helping them to meet their goals, and whether the conditions they are subject to are fair and transparent. Nevertheless we have a number of reservations about the benefits attached to pursuing the policy of contracting out –primarily because it seems that the private sector appears to achieve job outcomes that are at best, similar to the public sector. Furthermore in the UK, use of the private sector in employment programmes is often more expensive than public sector delivery.<sup>xx</sup>
- 5.2 Despite mixed evidence about the benefits, these reforms are already very much underway and so we will not be evaluating the pros and cons of contracting out welfare services in this response. Instead we raise a number of questions about the implementation of these changes, approaching the policy changes contained in *No one written off* from the perspective of lone parents. We also put forward some suggested ways for the Government to minimise the risks associated with commissioning out employment services on such a large scale.

*Can contracts be designed to direct support towards the hardest to help?*

5.3 When David Freud set out his vision for funding upfront investment in helping individuals with complex needs to get back to work (the ‘AME-DEL’ funding model) he argued that:

*“The Department [for Work and Pensions] should develop a funding approach which will allow it to direct spending towards such groups, who have complex and demanding problems, in a more individualized way. Such programmes should be outsourced into the private and voluntary sector, giving them the incentive to improve performance.”<sup>xxi</sup>*

5.4 While we hope that a commitment to supporting the hardest-to-reach claimants remains one of the key principles underpinning these reforms, we are far from confident that Freud’s vision will be translated into reality. This may be a problem for lone parents in particular because, at present, the Government looks set to encourage a focus on Incapacity Benefit claimants meaning that other groups will not be a priority for Flexible New Deal providers. Providers themselves have already expressed concerns that they will have no incentive to engage parents with children under seven, a group for whom many have already established specialist provision. The early versions of Employment Zones offered significantly lower payments for lone parents than for other groups. Unsurprisingly, qualitative evaluation finds that Employment Zone providers were offering less support to lone parents who were further away from work:

*“Lone parents who are referred by Jobcentre Plus are often described by providers as having too many problems to support with the available money or not interested in work, but only in education/training in preparation for work. Provider outreach activity is primarily aimed at those lone parents who can benefit from the EZ offer of work first provision.”<sup>xxii</sup>*

5.5 Even if contractor incentives were to be skewed towards lone parents, providers are still likely to find it expensive and time consuming to meet their complex needs. International research reveals a lack of evidence that external agencies offer any better solution to the challenge of providing for customers with multiple barriers. For example, it has been found that the pursuit of cost savings has damaged the service quality received by the most needy welfare recipients. Inevitably, contractors are likely to prioritise making a profit above delivering consistently good services to all claimants, irrespective of the costs involved. A recent report from Policy Exchange found that in Denmark:

*“The creation of the market exposed politicians to the problems of dealing with behaviour that was profit-seeking but not supportive of the needs of many claimants.”<sup>xxiii</sup>*

5.6 It will take the Government some time to design an incentive based system which does not inadvertently create perverse incentives for advisers on the frontline. Reviews of international experience have observed that instituting a system predicated on ‘payment by results’ is a difficult process of trial and error in every country. Several reports have identified two risks affecting disadvantaged claimants in these systems, dubbed, ‘parking and ‘creaming’:

*‘Deadweight losses are significant in systems that pay by results. ‘Creaming’, where companies concentrate on the people who are easiest to get back to*

*work, and ‘parking’, where private providers ignore the hardest to get into employment, can be significant problems. The state may therefore have to identify the hardest to place individuals if private contractors do not have a positive incentive to do so. However, for all parties it is hard to identify such people.*<sup>xxiv</sup>

- 5.7 Of course, these problems can also exist within public sector employment schemes. A number of strategies have been proposed for avoiding these outcomes. Defining some claimants as higher priority and either attaching higher payments to these claimants or specifying that a minimum proportion of job outcomes may come from this group may be another one way of seeking to minimize this problem. Allowing advisers to define who the most disadvantaged claimants are and awarding higher outcome payments for this group obviously increases the risk of creating perverse incentives. It is also problematic that the characteristics of ‘disadvantaged’ job seekers cannot necessarily be predicted (other than a clear correlation with qualification levels). Nevertheless, ensuring that a certain proportion of job outcomes must be come from priority groups – including lone parents - may help to avoid an unwelcome focus on the ‘easiest to help’.
- 5.8 The Social Market Foundation has also recommended increasing the rate of payment the further into a client group a provider has reached – so that payments should be greater for the 100<sup>th</sup> lone parent moved into work than for the first. Taken in isolation none of these approaches are likely to eliminate these risks completely, but a combination may be effective in protecting disadvantaged claimants. The Government’s strategy will also need to be revisited on a regular basis to ensure that gaps in the system are not being exploited by contractors

*Will the quality and sustainability of employment improve?*

- 5.9 In the UK the evaluation of Employment Zones is indicates that private contractors may have struggled to secure sustainable employment for its customers. For mandatory customers, the synthesis of evidence concludes that:

*“EZs results may also be short lived. Not only are relatively few jobs sustained longer than 13 weeks, but over time, there is a marked convergence between the performance of EZs and mandatory New Deals. For all their flexibilities, additional funding and focus on sustainable job outcomes, EZs results may simply reflect a funding regime which incentivises short term interventions and job outcomes.”*<sup>xxv</sup>

Meanwhile it seems that internationally, a range of different provider organisations in a variety of countries consistently favour short-term ‘work-first’ strategies over the provision of more expensive (longer-term) education and training. This means it is unlikely that the sub-contracting of employment services will be an effective strategy for raising skills.<sup>xxvi</sup> In the current economic climate claimants will already be at more risk of entering unstable employment, we are concerned that commissioning out these employment services could exacerbate this problem.

- 5.10 We welcome the intention to ask those who deliver the proposed ‘flexible new deal’ to pay more attention to sustainable employment Flexible New Deal outcomes are currently to be judged at six months, with the possibility mentioned of extending this to 18 months. We recommend that the outcome payment is moved to 12 months as soon as possible, before ultimately being extended to 18.

Private sector providers, *and* those who are publicly funded delivering skills interventions should be measured as job sustainability at 12 months.<sup>xxvii</sup>

5.11 Furthermore, when looking at job sustainability, the aim of policy should not be to keep a former claimant in the *same* job for 12 months, but to ensure that they are able to remain, and hopefully progress within the labour market. American research by Harry Holzer Fredrik Andersson and Julia Lane<sup>xxviii</sup> suggests that it is those job seekers who enter work and then change job rapidly who are most likely to escape low earnings.

*What is the role of the third or voluntary sector within these reforms?*

5.12 The role of the third sector within Flexible New Deal is not clear. On a practical level few third sector providers are likely to have sufficient capital to be able to bid to become a prime sector provider. While many may wish to become sub-contractors, as set out in the these sub contractors are likely to be significantly disadvantaged in terms of their market power – and it is unclear whether they will be able to insist on quality standards – and the resources to implement these, in their dealings with prime contractors. One report looking at the experience of welfare to work delivery under a privatized market in the United States finds that the experience of smaller not for profit agencies has been mixed.<sup>xxix</sup>

5.13 The qualities of innovation trust and ability to work with hard to reach groups for which the voluntary sector is valued may not be compatible with the ‘prime contractor model’ outline in *No one Written Off*. It cannot be assumed that the greater outsourcing of employment provision will necessarily lead to opportunities for the third sector to flourish, and it may be the case that it leads to a concentration of provision in the hands of the few private sector agencies who are able to finance the risks inherent in the system.

5.14 But perhaps more importantly, the position of third sector organisations delivering employment services could be compromised on an ethical level. Many third sector organizations including One Parent Families|Gingerbread have campaigned actively against parts of the Government’s welfare to work agenda. While we have not been successful in influencing the shift from an incentives/support based approach to a conditionality regime that imposes sanctions, One Parent Families|Gingerbread remains keen to find ways to support lone parents into work in practical ways.

5.15 However, a charity must retain the trust of its beneficiaries and put their interests first. Engagement by many charities, including One Parent Families|Gingerbread, is likely to be dependent on whether we are able to do so without our activities leading to the imposition of benefit sanctions on a lone parent, with consequent impact on that parent’s child or children. The recommendation within *No one Written Off* that Flexible New Deal participants must undertake compulsory workfare may also present third sector providers with new dilemmas. If Government wishes to encourage third sector engagement in the delivery of welfare to work services, it will need to listen carefully to the concerns of organisations who also wish to protect the rights of their clients.

*Will choice and user voice will enhanced?*

5.16 In *No one written off* the Government makes it clear that, for claimants, one of the advantages of commissioning services will be increased levels of choice between service providers:

*‘We are already testing this concept of choice between providers in three of our Pathways districts, allowing individuals to choose the best provider for them. We will test it again in the Flexible New Deal after contracts have been running for a year and we have built up a body of information that will inform customer choice.’<sup>xxx</sup>*

- 5.17 While we welcome the commitment to ‘allow customers the choice over which services they access and which providers they use.’ We think that there are a number of valid questions regarding quite how meaningful this choice will be. The assumption is that claimants will firstly, be able to choose the provision that is best tailored to their needs, and secondly, that this choice will drive up service quality. However, evidence to suggest that this has happened, or will happen on the ground, is thin. Lone parents in many areas already have the choice of providers, under multiple employment zones. The research suggests that although this has led to some innovation in service delivery in order to attract more claimants, most lone parents make their choice on the basis of convenience:

*‘To date it appears that choice of provider in lone parent provision has had few performance or cost-benefit impacts. This appears to be due to the fact that lone parents are not exercising choice between providers as intended Those lone parents that had made a choice between providers often did so based upon the proximity and convenience of provision rather than by weighing the merits of different types of service provided, or of providers’ relative performance. However, provider reputation communicated by word of mouth, and the types of support on offer did appear to influence the decision of some lone parents to join a particular provider, together with personal recommendation.’<sup>xxxi</sup>*

- 5.18 Evidence from abroad also indicates that contracting out welfare to work services has a very small impact on an individual’s ability to make informed decisions about the service which is right for them. Research found that in Australia:

*‘The ‘choice’ aspect of the market-based system has had little impact. Claimants have not acted like customers in a real market.’ ‘The idea of allowing claimants to choose between alternative providers is attractive in theory. It should put pressure on providers to offer jobless people the services they want in ways they find most accessible. And it should make it more likely that jobless people are matched to providers offering the approaches best suited to their needs. But Australian experience suggests that these theoretical attractions do not emerge in practice. Most claimants failed to choose and had to be assigned to a provider.’<sup>xxxii</sup>*

- 5.19 In reality, a lone parent’s choices will be extremely constricted. Firstly, the most important decision, how to combine paid work with caring for their family, will have been made for them by the dictates of the Jobseeker’s Allowance regime. Secondly, the proposed Flexible New Deal system intends to put in place only one prime provider in some areas, and two in others. Whilst these may use sub contractors to deliver different aspects of their services, a mandatory decision between two overarching options does not appear to open up broad choices for the claimant, or invest them with the power to significantly influence provision.
- 5.20 Given that claimants in the welfare to work system will have little possibility of choice, and no possibility of exit from the system, ensuring that they have ‘voice’ will be vital. We recommend the establishment of a local, independent, ombudsman within each region, who is tasked with investigating complaints

about unfair, discriminatory, or degrading treatment by Flexible New Deal providers. All claimants who are referred to a Flexible New Deal provider should be provided a statement of what they can expect from the provision, the way in which the provider is being funded to deliver the service (i.e. that the provider receives payment for helping them to access sustained employment), and details of how they can complain to this ombudsman if they feel that the service does not meet their expectations.

5.21 Complaints to the ombudsman that are upheld should be accompanied by financial penalties for the provider, and, in addition, complaints above a defined number should result in immediate termination of the contract. Claimant experience should also be a part of any star rating system established, particularly if this star rating system is to be used to help claimants have some (albeit limited) choice between providers.

## 6. 'Streamlining' Benefits

6.1 Nobody could disagree that the current system of benefits can be complex and confusing. But the reason that it has developed in this manner is because it has had to deal with a diverse range of circumstances in which people require support outside of the labour market. The current range of people entitled to Income Support gives some indication of this, including:

- Lone parents
- Carers
- Young people aged 16-17
- A range of groups with health related conditions.

6.2 These are groups for whom, at some point, the Government has decided that paid work may not be feasible – at least in the short term. If Income Support is to be abolished, there needs to be a different way of recognising that, as *No-one written off* states 'not everyone can work'.

6.3 At present, the Green Paper suggests that one of these groups, lone parents with children aged 0 – 7 be moved to Jobseeker's Allowance, but not be asked to seek work. This seems illogical, and risks complicating the JSA regime, rather than simplifying the benefits system. As described above, there are already tensions between the flexibilities that have necessarily been introduced for parents claiming JSA and the 'tougher' sanctions regime proposed here.

6.4 A much more logical destination for these groups would be the support rate of Employment and Support Allowance. In establishing this rate, Government has recognised that there are some groups that may need to be outside of the labour market for a time, and that they should be supported. The higher rate of this benefit recognises that these groups should not suffer poverty because they are not able to participate in paid work.

6.5 This does not mean that these groups would be 'written off' from the labour market altogether. We would expect those receiving the Support Rate of ESA to be receiving at least an annual assessment. And, in the current regime for lone parents, those parents whose children reached the age of seven would transfer to JSA. Given that we have seen no arguments that parents of 0 – 7 yr olds should be required to work, we would strongly oppose this group being transferred to even a modified form of Jobseeker's Allowance.

- 6.6 We also think there is a particularly strong case for allowing access to a ‘support’ benefit, rather than one with strict work requirements, for parents who have experienced domestic violence. Recent research by One Parent Families|Gingerbread and Family Action (formerly Family Welfare Association) found that the experience of domestic violence can severely dent confidence, as well as presenting real issues around an individual’s personal safety, and that of their children.<sup>1</sup> While we welcome the extension of the provision to exempt claimants in this situation from the requirement to actively seek work, we think that eight weeks is unlikely to be long enough to deal with the significant challenges these families face. Allowing families who have experienced domestic violence to claim the support rate of ESA for a period of a year before reassessment would allow them a safe and secure income from which to rebuild their lives.
- 6.7 We also think there is a case for extending this recognition that family stabilisation may require a period outside of the labour market to all families who have experienced separation. The current age related proposals for lone parents assume that, once children have reached the age of seven, parents will be accustomed to lone parenthood. But for the many parents who separate when their children are older, an immediate requirement to jobsearch may be inappropriate.
- 6.8 We think that many parents in this situation will be enthusiastic about moving back to employment, and want to reskill whilst they cannot be in paid work. We suggest that the ‘training premium’ suggested for parents of younger children should be applied to parents on ESA, were this radical simplification to be adopted. While we welcome the idea of the training premium, we recommend making it available to all parents, regardless of the age of their youngest child.
- 6.9 Ultimately, we believe it is vital that the benefit system retain some recognition that paid work is not always possible, at least in the short term, and that individuals playing other valuable roles in supporting themselves or their families must not be excluded. An expansion of the support rate of ESA seems a more logical form of benefit simplification than does introducing a Jobseeker’s Allowance regime that has different rules for different claimants.

## **7. The Way Forward**

- 7.1 *No one Written Off* represents yet another chapter in the Government’s ambitious programme of welfare reform. We have outlined our perspective on four of the key strands of this programme: conditionality, skills provision, contracting out and streamlining the benefit system. We have also raised a number of concerns about the pace at which the DWP is attempting to implement these major changes. In this final section we highlight some key issues which we hope will not be overlooked in the drive to usher in these reforms as rapidly as possible.

### *Flexible working*

- 7.2 The Government has set itself ambitious targets for the numbers of lone parents it wishes to move into employment. As lone parents adapt to meet the demands of working life, it will also be necessary for employers to build in greater flexibility to their practices. This means ‘skilling up’ employers to adapt to the complex needs of disabled employees or lone parents who could be entering the

<sup>1</sup> Bell, K and Kober C (2008) The financial impact of domestic violence. Family Welfare Association & One Parent Families|Gingerbread

workplace in ever greater numbers. As employees, lone parents will require particular support and flexibility to be in place to ensure that their employment is sustainable. It is vital that employers are enabled (and if necessary compelled) to meet these needs. While the Government has already taken important steps forward in this area, we are keen that lone parents have access to greater statutory rights when necessary.

- 7.3 Our research suggest the issue of flexible working may be a deciding factor for parents in many cases: 71 per cent of non-working lone parents in a survey of over 1000 cited a lack of childcare and jobs at suitable hours as a reason for not being in paid work.<sup>xxxiii</sup> Extending the right to request flexible working to parents of older children will one key element of this, and it is vital that it is not delayed. This would send out precisely the wrong message to parents worrying about whether take up jobs in a difficult economic climate.
- 7.4 There are a range of additional provisions which would also be helpful. For example, parents in Sweden are entitled to reduce their hours by 25 per cent until their children are eight, can spread their 480 days of paid parental leave over any period until their children reach this age, and have paid emergency leave rights. The 'local employment partnerships' offer a good opportunity for Government to put pressure on employers to provide work at flexible hours. We suggest that in order to be listed as a partner with Government in this way, employers should be asked to commit to providing job shares and the right to request flexible working for all parents, and to consider the possibilities for providing term time working options.

### *Childcare*

- 7.5 This Green paper acknowledges that incentivising training and offering packages of in-work support will also be essential in motivating more lone parents to make the move into work. It is also important to highlight another key ingredient in raising the numbers of lone parents participating in the labour-market. European welfare states with higher rates of lone parent employment than the UK also provide considerably more support to parents in the form of high quality childcare provision. A review of 20 countries found that the key factor in combining a high lone parent employment rate with low rates of child poverty was the provision of high quality publicly funded childcare.<sup>xxxiv</sup> The cost of childcare in the UK is still a prohibitive factor for many: parents here contribute to around 75 per cent of childcare costs compared to just 11 per cent in Sweden<sup>xxxv</sup> and around 30 per cent across Europe.
- 7.6 Given that the Government is focusing its energies on moving lone parents with older children into the employment market, it is a particular cause for concern that there is a shortage of suitable care for older children. A recent report for *4 children* found that there was only one place for every 200 children aged 11 – 14.<sup>xxxvi</sup> In this context it is scarcely conceivable that the proposal to ask lone parents whose youngest child is aged 12 to take up employment can be smoothly implemented as soon as 2008. We hope that greater emphasis will be placed on extending childcare provision one of the crucial elements underpinning any successful employment strategy.

### *The Social Fund*

7.7 In Chapter six of *No one written off* the Government states that ‘As always we are keeping the wider Social Fund under review.’ Despite some recent investment (set out in the 2004 Pre-Budget Report) a number of reports and voluntary sector organisations have amply demonstrated that the Social Fund remains unfit for purpose. It is currently struggling to meet the existing demand for help and is therefore failing to make a substantial impact on tackling poverty. While the Government’s commitment to looking at the scope for innovations (such private and third sector partnerships) is to be welcomed, the Social Fund urgently needs to be reformed so that it can start to fulfil its most basic functions.

#### *Work of less than 16 hours*

7.8 Finally, we once again note the Government’s lack of progress in tackling the poor incentives for those who wish to work for less than 16 hours a week. At present, due to the earnings disregard of only £20 in means tested benefits, and the fact that tax credits are not payable until 16 hours are worked, the incentives for lone mothers to work in such ‘mini jobs’ are extremely poor. Mothers in couples, who do not face these constraints, are much more likely to take up work of this type, helping to explain their higher employment rate: 8 per cent of employed lone mothers work in jobs of less than 16 hours compared with 17 per cent of mothers in couples.<sup>xxxvii</sup> The JRF / OPF research finds that increasing these to the level of 16 times the National Minimum Wage, could lead to a 5.4 percentage point increase in the lone parent employment rate, lifting many more children out of poverty. At a cost to Government of around £790 million, the cost per job would be far lower than that for the introduction of Working Families Tax Credit.<sup>xxxviii</sup>

### **Conclusion**

*‘Individual responsibility is at the heart of these reforms. For people to exercise this responsibility, we need to increase choice. People know what works best for them but we need to give them the ability to act on that knowledge’<sup>xxxix</sup>*

7.9 In this Green paper the Government outlines a vision of a welfare state which balances an individual’s rights against their responsibilities. Yet for groups such as lone parents we have seen a growing emphasis on responsibilities at the expense of their rights to take decisions about their working lives. While we hope that the sweeping changes to skills provision and welfare to work services will result in a greater degree of control for the individual; we are yet to be convinced that the voices of users will shape these reforms to a meaningful extent. The Government is right that people ‘*know what works best for them*’, and we hope that they will also draw on a wealth of information about the most effective strategies for supporting lone parents into work which is now available.

7.10 While we have opposed a number of the changes to the position of lone parents within the benefit system, we recognise that the Government has set out on a particular course, and consequently we are keen to ensure that these reforms are implemented as smoothly as possible. We believe the risks can be minimised if the Government takes the time to learn lessons from abroad and from the early stages of the Flexible New Deal. In the current economic climate, employment policy will need to be rigorously re-evaluated on a regular basis to ensure that vulnerable individuals and families are receiving sufficient protection from the state.



- <sup>i</sup> See National Statistics online: <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=12>
- <sup>ii</sup> Kasparova D, Marsh A, Vegeris S and Perry J (2003) *Families and Children 2001: Work and Childcare* DWP Research Report no. 191 Leeds: CDS.
- <sup>iii</sup> Peacey V (2007) *London lone parents' choices around work and care* London Child Poverty Commission.
- <sup>iv</sup> Ridge T (2007) 'It's a family affair: Low-income children's perspectives on maternal work' in *Journal of Social Policy* 36, 3, pp399-416 Cambridge University Press
- <sup>v</sup> Adelman L, Middleton S and Ashworth K (2003) *Britain's Poorest Children: Severe and persistent poverty and social exclusion* Save the Children. The update of this research also found that During 1994-2002, about two-fifths of children in persistent and severe poverty (42 per cent) or in short-term severe poverty (40 per cent) were from households with at least two transitions between work and no work, compared to only 14 per cent of all children from such households. Magadi M and Middleton S (2005) *Britain's poorest children revisited: Evidence from the BHPS (1994-2002) CRSP Research Report 3* Save the Children.
- <sup>vi</sup> Bell K, Branosky N, Fitzgerald J, Greenberg M, Harkness S, Hirsch D, Minoff E, and Wadia A, (2006) *Staying On, Stepping Up How can employment retention and advancement policies be made to work for lone parents* One Parent Families.
- <sup>vii</sup> Evans M, Eyre J, Millar J and Sarre S, 2005, *New Deal for Lone Parents second synthesis report of the national evaluation*, Sheffield, Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No. 16 .
- <sup>viii</sup> Yeo Alisdair (2007) Experience of work and job retention among lone parents: an evidence review DWP Working Paper No 37 DWP.
- <sup>ix</sup> DWP (2008) *More Support, higher expectations: the role of conditionality in improving employment outcomes* A background research and discussion paper
- <sup>x</sup> Department for Work and Pensions (July 2008) *No one written off: reforming welfare to reward responsibility* Public Consultation
- <sup>xi</sup> Goodwin V, DWP (2008) *The effects of benefit sanctions on lone parents' employment decisions and moves into employment* carried out by the Centre for Public Policy, University of Northumbria on behalf of the Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 511
- <sup>xii</sup> Source: Parliamentary Question answered 19.04.07
- <sup>xiii</sup> Evans M and Miller J eds. (2003) *Lone parents and employment: international comparisons of what works* DWP.
- <sup>xiv</sup> Haskins R (2007) 'The US Experience' Presentation for conference on Welfare Reform; Choices, Challenges and International Insights held on 26<sup>th</sup> March 2007. Available here: <http://www.dwp-welfare-conference.org/> and see Blank R and Kovac B (2008) *The Growing Problem of Disconnected Single Mothers* Paper prepared for the project "Pathways to Self-Sufficiency," organized by the Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin.
- <sup>xv</sup> See Monnatt S (2008) *Sanctions: A multi-level analysis of benefit reductions and case closures* Presentation to Welfare Research and Evaluation Conference at: <http://peerta.acf.hhs.gov/uploadedFiles/ACFPresentation.Monnat.ppt#256,1,Sanctions: A Multi-Level Analysis of Benefit Reductions and Case Closures>
- <sup>xvi</sup> Department for Work and Pensions (July 2008) *No one written off: reforming welfare to reward responsibility* Public Consultation
- <sup>xvii</sup> Crisp, R and Fletcher, D (2008) *A comparative review of workfare programmes in the United States, Canada and Australia* carried out by CRESR on behalf of the Department for Work and Pensions, Research report 533
- <sup>xviii</sup> Finn, D (2007) *Contracting out welfare to work in the USA: delivery lessons* DWP Research report No 466
- <sup>xix</sup> One Parent Families|Gingerbread and WorkDirections *Employment, opportunity and skills, where next?* See <http://www.oneparentfamilies.org.uk/1/lx3x10lx20x10ex310x10ix9741x1/o/o/061008/o/o//Employment-Opportunity-Skills.htm>
- <sup>xx</sup> Griffiths R and Durkin S (2007) *Synthesising the evidence on employment zones* DWP Research Report No. 449.
- <sup>xxi</sup> Freud D (2007) *Reducing dependency, increasing opportunity: options for the future of welfare to work, An independent report to the Department for Work and Pensions* available at <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2007/welfarereview.pdf>
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- <sup>xxiii</sup> Lilley, P and Hatwich, O, (2008) *Paying For Success: How to make contracting out work in employment services* Policy Exchange
- <sup>xxiv</sup> Lilley, P and Hatwich, O, (2008) *Paying For Success: How to make contracting out work in employment services* Policy Exchange

- <sup>xxv</sup> Hirst A, Tarling R, Lefauchaux M, Short C, Rinne S, McGregor A, Glass Aevans M and Simm C (2006) *Evaluation of multiple provider employment zones – early implementation issues* DWP Research Report No 310 Corporate Document Services.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> Wright, S (2008) *Welfare reform and the use of external agencies to provide employment services: lessons from international research* Commissioned by Child Poverty Action Group
- <sup>xxvii</sup> One Parent Families|Gingerbread and WorkDirections Sustainable employment and skills; questions arising from 'Opportunity Employment and Progression, making skills work' available at: [http://www.oneparentfamilies.org.uk/dr\\_media/opf/Jan08skills-employment-with-work-directions\\_15-Sep-08.pdf](http://www.oneparentfamilies.org.uk/dr_media/opf/Jan08skills-employment-with-work-directions_15-Sep-08.pdf)
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- <sup>xxix</sup> Finn D (2007) *Contracting out welfare to work in the USA: delivery lessons* DWP Research Report No. 466.
- <sup>xxx</sup> Department for Work and Pensions (July 2008) *No one written off: reforming welfare to reward responsibility* Public Consultation
- <sup>xxxi</sup> Griffiths R and Durkin S (2007) *Synthesising the evidence on employment zones* DWP Research Report No. 449.
- <sup>xxxii</sup> Lilley, P and Hatwich, O, (2008) *Paying For Success: How to make contracting out work in employment services* Policy Exchange
- <sup>xxxiii</sup> One Parent Families conducted an internet survey of lone parent members of One Parent Families, Gingerbread, and One Parent Families Scotland. 1060 parents responded to the survey, which was funded by Jobcentre Plus.
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- <sup>xxxv</sup> OECD (2005) op cit note xiii.
- <sup>xxxvi</sup> Buck K (2007) *Still Home Alone? Developing 'next generation' care for older children* 4Children.
- <sup>xxxvii</sup> Bell K, Brewer M and Phillips D (2007) *Lone parents and 'mini jobs'* Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- <sup>xxxviii</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xxxix</sup> Department for Work and Pensions (July 2008) *No one written off: reforming welfare to reward responsibility* Public Consultation p.118